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KEY POINTS
 Blockchain/distributed ledger technology has been said to make it possible for trading, 
clearing and settlement of securities to merge into one real time process.
 The Bitcoin environment could go down the route of intermediation over time.
 There are reasons to be pessimistic about the emergence of an overall efficient 
framework.
 There should be disclosure of sub-custody arrangements allowing investors to evaluate 
the fee structure and the risk they are exposed to.
Authors Eva Micheler and Luke von der Heyde
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In this article, the authors assess the benefits of blockchain/distributed ledger 
technology for the holding, clearing and settlement of securities currently  
held in intermediated holding structures and consider the steps needed to 
facilitate an efficient market. The recommendation is that investors should 
receive full disclosure of the custody and sub-custody arrangements associated 
with their investments.
TECHNOLOGY IN FINANCIAL 
MARKETS
nTechnology changes society, but sometimes in surprising ways. In the 
case of securities computers have all but 
eliminated transaction risk while at the 
same time introducing custody risk. 
When computers were first introduced 
into financial markets there was a lot of 
excitement and urgency about replacing 
paper with electronic settlement. The 
transformation was not easy however. It 
took almost 10 years for the electronic 
settlement system CREST to come live. 
Interestingly the reform did not lead to 
the creation of a new system from scratch 
that may have reflected the possibilities 
offered by the technology. As it turned 
out the system that was created closely 
resembled the paper settlement and 
holding system. The existing framework 
was preserved with the modification that 
communication by paper was replaced with 
communication by electronic instructions. 
The providers of the infrastructure remained 
in place and their processes were repeated on 
computers instead of paper ledgers.1
The availability of almost instant 
electronic communication has had an 
additional and surprising effect. When 
securities were transferred by way of paper, 
investors used to have their name entered 
on the issuer register. It took some time for 
a transfer to be recorded on the register, but 
the investor had a direct connection with 
the issuer. While settlement of trades was 
cumbersome, it was easy to hold securities 
and exercise rights arising out of them.2 
The introduction of uncertificated 
(electronic) securities changed that balance. 
Settlement times were reduced allowing  
the speed of transferring securities to 
increase, but the holding of securities 
and the ability of investors to exercise 
their rights has become significantly more 
complex and risky. 
Investors have become separated 
from issuers through intermediation. A 
framework emerged whereby the names 
of investors were removed from the issuer 
register and replaced by nominees who hold 
securities on trust for investors or, more 
likely, other intermediaries. 
This has made the enforcement of rights 
very difficult if not outright impossible. 
It stands in the way of shareholders 
exercising voting rights. Investors bear 
the risk associated with all intermediaries 
that operate between them and the 
issuer. Regulators struggle to keep up 
with increasing levels of intermediation 
spanning across borders. The introduction 
of computers has made trading easy, but 
holding assets more complex.3 
Information technology has simplified 
connections. We speak to each other and 
send messages in real time and across 
borders without friction. Yet in relation to 
financial assets the opposite has happened. 
Investors have become separated from 
their assets. This is because computers by 
making it easier to connect have also made 
it easier to intermediate. The ease with 
which connections can be made has made 
it possible for chains of intermediaries to 
build up in the system.4 
Intermediation has advantages for 
service providers. It facilitates innovation. 
Intermediation enables an innovating 
service provider to provide a service without 
having to persuade investors to switch. 
Through intermediation incumbent service 
providers can buy that service without 
making his clients aware of an alternative 
provider and will do so if it reduces his cost 
base. Between the two of them this creates 
an efficient outcome. 
It has been shown elsewhere that this 
does not necessarily lead to an efficient 
result from the perspective of the system 
overall and in particular for investors who 
bear the cost and risk associated with the 
overall system.5 In the case of securities the 
effect of intermediation has been to erode 
investor rights. In a direct holding system 
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investors are only exposed to the risk 
associated with the issuer. 
In an intermediated model, in addition 
to the issuer’s risk investors bear the risk of 
all intermediaries that act between them 
and the issuer. When Bear Stearns was 
restructured an excess of 28% of shares 
compared to the shares issued by the 
company was discovered. The European 
Commission writes in the discussion 
paper justifying the Regulation on Central 
Securities Depositaries that: 
‘Fortunately, Bear Stearns was rescued 
through a takeover by JP Morgan which 
bailed out the excess of securities.’6 
In reality this means, of course, that 
the price that JP Morgan was prepared to 
pay was distributed between all indirect 
investors diluting each of their shares. This is 
not efficient. 
Investors also encounter problems when 
attempting to exercise their rights. Issuers 
may find that a custody chain protects 
them against claims from issuers,7 but also 
experience problems when they need to 
reach investors to restructure debt. This 
can delay insolvency proceedings. 
A situation has arisen where the 
economics that operate between 
intermediaries have created externalities for 
investors and issuers leading to an overall 
inefficient system.
BLOCKCHAIN/DISTRIBUTED 
LEDGER TECHNOLOGY
With blockchain/distributed ledger 
technology a new technology for keeping 
securities registers and for updating them has 
become available. The technology has been 
said to make it possible for trading, clearing 
and settlement to merge into one real time 
process that does not involve relationships 
with multiple intermediaries. There is no 
need for separate trading, clearing and 
settlement venues. There is no exposure to 
the risk of any one central provider failing. 
Buyer and seller can interact directly with 
each other. They can exchange securities and 
cash directly and in real time. 
In terms of user interface not much 
needs to change. Investors would access 
their portfolio as they do now through 
a computer or through some other 
electronic device. But while at present the 
interface they see is a record kept by an 
intermediary who is connected to another 
intermediary who is connected to yet 
another intermediary, what they see in a 
blockchain/distributed ledger environment 
would be the master record. 
The same could become true on the 
money side. At present investors view a 
balance of an account held by a bank. In 
the future their view could be of a master 
record of money held at the central bank. 
This raises important questions about the 
role of banks. At present bank deposits 
fund lending. If individuals stop providing 
banks with deposits, lending will have to 
be funded in other ways. But then who says 
that that is impossible. 
This development is exciting. It would 
reduce complexity and remove intermediary 
risk from financial markets for both assets 
and cash. There would still be counter-
party risk but with only one (shared and 
distributed) master record, the risk of 
double-spending reduced to almost zero 
by way of blockchain/distributed ledger 
technology, and payment linked to delivery, 
this appears to be very low. 
It looks like blockchain/distributed 
ledger technology could create a world 
where transaction risk is minimised and 
intermediary risk is eliminated. 
There is, of course, a risk that the 
computers break down or will be hacked 
into, but because every node has an 
identical copy of the ledger that risk has 
been referred to as very small. 
We do not know yet what the 
technology is capable of, but let us 
assume for the purpose of this article, 
that computer science can deliver an un-
intermediated ledger allowing investors to 
hold and transfer securities and money in 
real time. 
And while we are making assumptions 
let’s also assume that national borders can 
be overcome by technology or perhaps 
better that the technology is scalable in 
a way that accommodates the volumes of 
domestic as well as cross border holdings 
and transfers. 
The question then is, will this happen?
Before we attempt to look into the 
future it is worth having a quick look at 
bitcoin for which blockchain/distributed 
ledger technology was invented. 
LESSONS FROM BITCOIN
Bitcoin is an open source un-permissioned 
distributed ledger. Anyone can join and 
maintain this ledger. Those maintaining it 
are paid by a combination of new coins and 
fees. Overtime the system will switch over 
to a fee only reward to those maintaining 
the chain. The combination of open access 
and a fee provides an incentive for miners 
to maintain the ledger. The software is 
updated by a group of developers on an 
informal basis taking into account the 
views of miners. 
There is apparently no or rather very 
little concern that this openness will enable 
the wrong kind of computer scientist to 
manipulate the system. The risk of miners 
manipulating the content of the ledger is 
low as long as there are a significant number 
of them and no single miner controls half or 
more of the network’s computing power. 
In addition to the ledger being 
distributed it is maintained in the form of 
a blockchain. The entries are connected 
to each other in a way that causes 
manipulation to become immediately 
apparent. 
Compared to the current system where 
manipulation could and has occurred in the 
past at any level of the intermediation chain 
and could go/has gone undetected  
for some time Bitcoin’s technology  
promises significant improvement. Slightly 
tongue in cheek it is worth remembering 
that Bitcoin’s technology has proven 
remarkably temper resistant in markets 
that are challenging even compared to 
financial markets. 
Bitcoin’s blockchain/distributed ledger 
then provides users with a direct way of 
holding something that we can, without 
having to answer the question of what 
bitcoin are, call a token, but that might 
as well also be an asset. Bitcoin’s ledger 
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enables direct holdings. It operates peer to 
peer, no intermediaries are required.
The technology can, however, also be 
used in a way that creates a closed network 
of permissioned participants who hold 
assets as intermediaries. 
In the context of Bitcoin, for example, 
an intermediated option has become 
available. The bitcoin software was not 
designed to be appealing to users that 
are spoilt by smartphone technology. 
Individuals hold bitcoins through wallets. 
Wallets are a type of software that connect 
to the bitcoin main software. 
Bitcoins are transferred by way of a 
private key. A private key is a series of 
numbers and letters. To the completely 
uninitiated it could be referred to as a very 
long password. 
The private key needs to be typed into 
the Bitcoin software to authorise a transfer 
of coins. While it appears to be next to 
impossible to hack into the main software, 
it is not impossible to lose a private key. It 
is important to store the key safely. The 
weakest point of the bitcoin network is the 
storage of the private key. Reports about 
theft of bitcoins refer to thefts of private 
keys. This occurs when a hacker succeeds in 
extracting a private key from a computer. 
Storing the private key only on the hard 
drive of a computer that is connected to 
the internet is not a good idea. Neither is 
destroying your hard drive without first 
making a note of your private key. Ideally 
you store it cold, ie in some way that is not 
connected to the internet. Writing it down 
and putting it in a safe comes to mind. 
Wallet software helps with creating 
and storing private keys. There is a range 
of services available. At one end of the 
spectrum is software that only connects to 
the bitcoin software and does not look after 
private keys at all. The wallet holder looks 
after his private key. This is a direct way of 
holding bitcoin. It is sometimes referred to 
as a non-hosted wallet. 
At the other end of the spectrum is 
an intermediated solution referred to as 
a hosted wallet. Coinbase, for example, is 
a wallet provider whose customers do not 
know the private key associated with their 
coins. Coinbase is a custodian of private 
keys. They keep wallets for customers. 
These show bitcoin balances. But they 
only record claims against Coinbase. Their 
general terms state that transactions  
can take up to 48 hours or more when 
private keys are sourced from their cold 
storage facility.8 
Coinbase also operates an exchange 
and in that capacity is entitled to settle 
transactions between customers that both 
have wallets with Coinbase internally. This 
can sometimes be referred to as a sale “off 
blockchain”. 
Those who are familiar with securities 
settlement systems would refer to Coinbase as 
an intermediated holding and transfer system 
for bitcoins. 
MtGox, a bitcoin exchange that is now in 
insolvent liquidation, also operated custody 
services for coins and cash. It too established 
an intermediated model. 
Hosted wallets have, however, not gone 
down well with the bitcoin community. 
Coinbase have recently been placed on the 
bottom of a ranking of wallet providers 
published by an organisation referred 
to as Open Bitcoin Privacy Project. The 
reason was their custodianship of customer 
funds. Interestingly their response was to 
point out that they view themselves more 
as a retail exchange rather than a wallet 
provider.9 
It remains to be seen if the bitcoin 
environment will also go down the route of 
intermediation over time. 
LOOKING INTO THE FUTURE 
There has been significant interest in 
and great excitement about blockchain/
distributed ledger technology. The 
last few months have seen a number of 
announcements about making use of 
blockchain/distributed ledger technology 
for securities settlement. Major market 
players are investing in the technology. 
Here are some themes that emerge from 
this material. 
Euroclear and Oliver Wyman, for 
example, have published a paper in 
which they envisage that in the future 
blockchain technology will underlie the 
holding and transfer of financial assets. 
They stress that the very fact that the 
ledger is distributed means that different 
providers can be accommodated. This 
will make it easier for the technology to 
be adopted. They, however, also point out 
that there is a risk that the technology will 
challenge the business model of incumbent 
custodians.10 
Michael Mainelli and Alistair Milne 
have published a survey of participants in 
the settlement and custody industry.11 It 
reveals a variety of interesting points. 
One comment is that turkeys are 
unlikely to vote for Christmas. Interviewees 
also mention that they are comfortable 
allowing their clients to hold assets on a 
disintermediated basis enabling them to 
form relationships with competitors. 
Perhaps the most important outcome 
of the survey is that business processes 
are a significant barrier towards any 
update of technology. The issue is not 
just demonstrating technical feasibility 
but rather achieving the necessary co-
ordination in the adaptation of the  
business processes. 
Another interesting insight emerging 
from this recent material is that real 
time settlement is possible with current 
technology. It seems that business processes 
and legacy systems are responsible for 
the standard T+2 (London) or T+3 (New 
York) timeframe. The problem is that 
trades are made before buyers and sellers 
have the cash and the securities in place. 
This is interesting because from the retail 
end brokers are unlikely to enter into 
transactions before the money and the 
securities respectively are in place. 
An important outcome of the discussion 
of blockchain technology for securities has 
thus been that existing technology does 
not appear to stand in the way of a more 
efficient framework. Technology is not  
the problem. 
Unsurprisingly then it has been 
observed that existing projects, as far as is 
visible at the moment, appear to combine 
elements of blochchain/distributed 
ledger technology in a way that causes 
the outcome to revert to the existing 
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framework. There is a significant focus on 
permissioned systems. This means that the 
keepers of the ledger are only participants 
that have received permission, perhaps 
by a central authority. Once a network 
is permissioned the question arises if it 
is necessary to create a blockchain. Does 
every new transaction really have to be 
checked against and joined up with all 
previous transactions? Is it not enough to 
have trusted participants keep the register? 
There is also and once again significant 
focus on transactions, but not much 
interest in the perspective of investors and 
their rights. 
There are therefore reasons to be 
pessimistic about the emergence of an 
overall efficient framework. This also fits 
with past experience with technological 
innovation. It has already been mentioned 
that the changeover from paper to 
electronic settlement in the UK was fraught 
with difficulties. The incumbent market 
participants tried to build a computer 
system called Taurus and failed. The Bank 
of England took over and established 
CREST. Reform took some 10 years. A 
significant amount of money was spent 
on a project that had to be abandoned. It 
is not easy to see through reform if that 
means disturbing the business model of 
established service providers. 
Moreover, as far as the UK domestic 
market is concerned there already exists 
and un-intermediated infrastructure. It 
is possible in the UK for investors to have 
accounts with CREST enabling them to 
hold uncertificated securities directly at the 
level of the master record. Notwithstanding 
the fact that this option has been available, 
an intermediated model has emerged. 
Interestingly the same was historically 
true for the now intermediated German 
system. It was for some time possible for 
individual investors to maintain accounts 
directly with the German CSD, now 
Clearstream Banking Frankfurt. 
Given the disadvantages associated  
with intermediated holding structures, it  
is hard to explain why investors have 
accepted a framework that causes them 
significant problems. 
Michael Milne has pointed out that 
technological innovation is subject to a 
phenomenon entitled “excess inertia”. This 
is a form of market failure. An inefficient 
market infrastructure persists if the cost of 
change for individual participants is higher 
than their individual gain. This prevents 
technological innovation that would reduce 
the cost for the industry overall.  
This explains why it is hard to introduce 
innovation. It does not explain, however, why 
a direct paper model has transformed itself 
into an intermediated electronic model. 
We have seen that intermediation is 
facilitated by computer technology. What 
remains to be explained here then is why 
asset holders appear to have accepted the 
intermediated model in circumstances 
where there was a direct alternative. 
This applies in particular to investment 
managers some of whom have significant 
market power. 
One possible explanation for the success 
of the intermediated model could be price. 
It is sometimes said that fees associated 
with direct holdings are higher than fees 
associated with indirect holdings. 
It is true that in a paper environment 
intermediation saved cost because it 
reduced the amount of paper that had 
to be physically moved. This is what 
explains why intermediation occurred in 
Germany. This was at a time where there 
was no electronic alternative. In the UK 
however, intermediation coincided with the 
elimination of paper. 
In an electronic environment the cost of 
maintaining one account should be lower 
than the cost of maintaining and reconciling 
several accounts over multiple levels. 
What then explains lower prices 
for intermediated electronic accounts? 
Intermediaries do more than keep accounts. 
They normally provide and charge for a 
bundle of services. Record keeping can, for 
example, be bundled together with foreign 
exchange services. 
Holding securities can also produce 
income that enables an intermediary 
to offer low fees. For example, recent 
regulatory changes requiring explicit client 
consent for securities lending can provide 
evidence for the fact that intermediaries 
may have benefitted from lending income 
in the past without clients necessarily 
understanding that this was the case.12 
Bundling makes it difficult for investors 
to evaluate the price for an intermediated 
service. 
Statements do not reveal that there is a 
chain of intermediaries operating between 
the investor and the issuer. Custody terms 
enable intermediaries to outsource the 
holding of securities, but do not show if 
the power has been exercised and who the 
holding of securities has been delegated 
to. They also do not disclose how many 
intermediaries operate between the client 
and the issuer. 
The combination of bundled services 
and the lack of transparency about the 
structure of the chain makes it next to 
impossible for investors to evaluate the 
prices offered against the service levels and 
the associated risk. 
FACILITATING AN EFFICIENT 
MARKET: LESSONS FOR 
REGULATORS AND ASSET HOLDERS
From the perspective of regulators it is 
important to understand what can be done 
to facilitate the emergence of an efficient 
infrastructure. 
This cannot and should not be done 
from scratch. It is important to take 
advantage of the expertise and resources 
that are available in the existing system. 
It would however be wrong to forgo the 
opportunity to improve the efficiency of 
the existing model by constructing new 
technology with a view to minimising the 
disturbance of the existing business model. 
Incumbent service providers are unable to 
eliminate inefficiencies of the system as a 
whole when these are efficient from their 
individual perspective. 
Regulators and in particular the 
European Securities Markets Authority 
are likely to take a keen interest. The key is 
to encourage investment in infrastructure 
that is designed with a view to improving 
efficiency for those who pay for the 
infrastructure and bear the risk associated 
with it. 
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The cost and the risk of the 
infrastructure are borne by asset holders. 
It is important to ensure that asset holders 
are consulted. That, for example, did 
not happen in the case of the EU’s Legal 
Certainty Project which was set up to 
improve the legal framework supporting 
the market infrastructure for the holding 
and transferring of securities.13 Advisers 
to the project consisted mainly of experts 
associated with the custody industry. 
There were experts without an affiliation 
to particular custodians, but asset holders 
were not represented. 
At present asset holders only receive 
statements showing that securities are 
held for them. General terms permit 
outsourcing, but do not inform investors if 
that power has been exercised. Investors are 
unable to evaluate the risk associated with 
the services they are offered. 
The regulator should enable investors 
to form a view on the risk associated 
with and the price offered by the current 
infrastructure. A straightforward way 
of achieving this would be by way of 
disclosure. Custodians should be required 
to disclose to investors that they have 
outsourced custody. They should not only 
reveal that custody has been outsourced but 
also enable investors to evaluate the chain 
that they are associated with. They should 
reveal details about the service providers 
that operate between them and the issuer. 
And finally leaving regulators aside the 
ball is in the court of asset holders some 
of whom have the muscle to ask questions 
about how their assets are held. They are 
also able to involve themselves in the current 
discussion about how the new technology, if 
it is to be used, should be implemented. n 
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